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Introduction 
The rising generation of Russian foreign policy experts and commentators, especially outside 
Moscow, is increasingly sceptical about the key premises of Russian diplomacy and see more 
failures than achievements in Russia’s relations with its closest partners, including the EU 
and  neighbouring  states.  This  is  the  conclusion  that  stems  from  a  series  of  about  90 
interviews  and  focus  groups  with  young  Russian  professionals  about  Russia’s  current 
foreign  policies,  which  were  conducted  by  the  authors  in  March-April  2012,  for  the 
Gorchakov and the Nasledie Evrazii Foundations in three cities – Nizhny Novgorod, Tomsk 
and  Petrozavodsk.  The  respondents  were  mostly  graduates  of  international  relations 
programmes with professional international experience in business, non-commercial sectors, 
education, journalism, public service and academia. This paper summarises the key findings 
of this project and discusses their practical implications. 
The field of International Relations (IR) studies has gone through substantial transformation 
in  Russia  during  the  last  two  decades.  In  the  USSR  the  Moscow  State  Institute  of 
International  Relations  (MGIMO)  held  the  monopoly  on  training  IR  specialists  and 
diplomats.  Yet  since  the  mid-1990s,  this  monopoly  has  eroded,  and  major  regional 
universities  (Saint  Petersburg,  Nizhniy  Novgorod,  Yekaterinburg,  Tomsk,  Voronezh, 
Ivanovo, Volgograd, Tyumen, Irkutsk, Vladivostok, Petrozavodsk, Syktyvkar, etc.) started 
establishing their own IR departments and developing IR programmes. This opening of a 
prestigious yet previously Moscow-dominated profession reflected the growing activity of 
regions  in  international  domain,  and  also  signalled  a  decentralisation  of  governance  in 
Russia.  
The study showed that during two decades of de-monopolisation of IR in Russia a new 
generation of specialists emerged and matured. The IR graduates from regional universities 
have both knowledge and their own opinions about achievements and failures of Russian 
foreign policy. Although the two foundations that commissioned the research were eager to 
receive  suggestions  on  how  to  improve  current  foreign  policy,  the  study  uncovered  the 
existence  of  strong  cognitive  dissonance  between  the  official  diplomatic  discourse  of  the 
Kremlin and the perceptions of young experts who work in a variety of fields dealing with 
international  cooperation  either  at  a  lower  level  of  the  state  hierarchy  or  in  different 
professional domains. This paper presents some findings on how young non-Moscow-based 
IR professionals assess and evaluate the current foreign policy of Russia. 
Methodologically,  we  used  a  questionnaire,  which  contained  five  blocks  (respondents’ 
personal profile, Russia’s foreign policy priorities, public diplomacy, information policy and 
human  resources  in  the  Russian  diplomatic  service  and  information  about  the  region’s 
resources  of  internationalisation),  and  contained  more  than  20  specific  questions. 
Interviewees  were  university  graduates,  post-graduate  students,  journalists,  businessmen 2 |  DERIGLAZOVA, MAKARYCHEV & REUT 
 
and public officials, all under the age of 30. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. In 
each of the regions we conducted four in-depth interviews (from 1 to 1.5 hours long), 16 half-
structured interviews (from 0.5 to 1 hour) and one focus group (about 2 hours long) with 
about  10  participants  representing  different  spheres  (higher  education,  state  service, 
journalism, non-governmental organisations and entrepreneurship). 
Main Findings: No Good News for the Kremlin 
Firstly, young Russian professionals are markedly doubtful that the post-Soviet region is 
indeed  the  key  priority  for  Russian  diplomacy.  Moscow’s  policies  in  the  CIS  were 
characterised as “neo-imperialist”, “irresponsible”, or “bringing no practical dividends for 
the  population”  (the  latter  statement  was  related  to  Russia’s  “de-facto  occupation  of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia”), but definitely not as “cooperative”. Many respondents deem 
that the August 2008 war with Georgia was one of the major diplomatic failures of Russia, 
and expect the restoration of bilateral relations after the Saakashvili tenure. At the same time 
some respondents assumed that one of the effects of the military campaign was a growing 
respect towards Russia.   
In  the  meantime,  for  many  interviewees,  the  countries  seen  as  genuinely  important  for 
Russia are in the West, above all the EU and United States. Most of them portrayed Russia as 
a  de-ideologised  ‘corporate  state’,  which  comprehends  the  benefits  it  derives  from 
cooperation with the West, yet this pragmatism is too often undermined by nationalistic 
rhetoric and (mostly symbolic) attempts to challenge Europe and/or America. Sometimes, as 
a couple of experts presumed, the perceived disconnections with the West are unintended 
effects of Russia’s adherence to obsolete communications instruments and a foreign policy 
vocabulary that is hardly compatible with those practiced by its Western interlocutors. 
Respondents  referred  to  widespread  anti-American,  anti-Western  and  anti-NATO 
stereotypes among many Russians, especially among the older generation. One respondent 
said: “Many people think that the main enemy of Russia is America, and that we should be 
ready for a fight and have to contain it by all possible means.” Some deplored that Russia 
often  looks  for  friends  among  those  countries  that  challenge  the  US.  It  was  noted  that 
Russian  mainstream  media  often  create  and  support  narratives  of  Russia  as  a  country 
allegedly surrounded by adversaries who wish to weaken Russia. Some recalled widespread 
spy mania and conspiracy theories deeply rooted among older generations. Talking about 
Russia’s  self-perception,  respondents  ironically  referred  to  “remnants  of  the  imperial 
syndrome” and a “great nuclear power complex” that wishes to be involved everywhere, 
and is reluctant to compromise as a result of this misplaced sense of grandeur.  
Secondly, none of the respondents believed in Russia’s “civilisational” mission, while some 
even identified certain dangers in messianic rhetoric. This scepticism can be explained by the 
growing mistrust toward the state and the Russian Orthodox Church as the two sources of 
civilisational discourse in Russia. Some of the young experts acknowledged that the self-
ascribed role of a “bridge between West and East” is neither recognised nor accepted by 
other  nations.  Ironically,  the  focus  group  participants  assumed  that  perhaps  Russia’s 
“mission” in the world is to expel the best minds out of the country and thus contribute to 
the cultural and technological development of the West. 
Even those who still think that Russia has a mission interpret it quite differently. They tend 
to believe that Russia is a part of European civilization, mostly referring to its literature, 
language, history, music and cultural heritage. Another interpretation puts Russia’s mission 
in  a  regional  rather  than  a  global  context,  which  can  make  some  sense  only  for  those 
countries  that  are  located  at  the  cultural  intersection  of  Asia  and  Europe,  such  as,  for 
instance, Central Asia which can appreciate Russia’s help to move them closer to European RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT IS NOT SEEN FROM THE KREMLIN | 3 
 
civilisation. Thus Russia could provide “regionally adapted versions of European cultural 
patterns to peoples of the post-Soviet region that differ tremendously from Europeans”. In 
other  words,  Russia  is  viewed  as  a  country  that  ‘is  deeply  entrenched  in  Asia’  but  still 
remains a part of Europe. 
However, instead of futile talks about a “civilisational mission”, most of the interviewees 
were open to a different concept – that of “soft power” which Russia potentially possesses 
due to its rich historical heritage and dynamic cultural life (music, cinema, arts, literature, 
etc.). Yet, unfortunately, neither the state nor the Russian corporate world is interested in 
promoting these “immaterial attractors” to Western audiences. The Russkii Mir Foundation’s 
exclusive focus on Russian-speaking communities abroad is obviously insufficient. 
Those respondents who opined that the countries of the ‘near aboard’ are natural allies of 
Russia, assumed that they should be given more attention and respectfully treated as equals. 
Many  experts  noted  that  still  there  is  more  rhetoric  than  real  substance  in  Russia’s 
relationship within CIS countries, and it is exactly this short-sighted approach that pushed 
some of them towards the West. Against this backdrop, Russia is steadily losing its influence 
in  former  Soviet  republics,  because  it  often  treats  them  as  “not  fully  independent”. 
Respondents  reasonably  claimed  that  the  Kremlin  expects  special  loyalty  from  Russia’s 
neighbours and neglects the simple fact that all post-Soviet political leaders are motivated by 
their own countries’ national agendas. The well-known problems with the Russian language 
in former Soviet countries are the results of such a policy, which enlarges the gaps in mutual 
understanding and creates obstacles for full-fledged cooperation. The problem is the hard, 
heavy-handed  politicisation  of  the  language  question  by  the  Kremlin.  This  is  in  strong 
contrast to what young IR professionals advocate, namely a soft-power promotion of the 
Russian language and culture, which has huge potential if done in a manner that makes no 
association with semi-coercive diplomacy. 
Thirdly, the young Russian international relations specialists do not seem to believe that 
their country is rising from its knees. As many respondents assumed, Russia initially thought 
that  it  was  capable  of  maintaining  its  role  in  the  international  system  as  a  great  power 
roughly equal in status to the US and the EU. Russia’s leaders continue to believe that its 
place at the table of the leading powers is assured, that it could and should be a rule-maker 
and not a rule-taker in the international system. Yet at the same time, Russia’s foreign policy 
is typically characterised as lacking in priorities, erratic, circumstantial, mostly reactive and 
short of constructive ideas – as illustrated, for instance, by the its position in the UN debate 
on Syria, which was widely perceived by the Western public as Russia being in solidarity 
with a tyrant. Consequently, the Kremlin’s resistance to the West is mostly symbolic and 
rhetorical, and lacks a considered strategy.  
Russia’s foreign policy was often described by interviewees as “one-sided”, which broadens 
a gap between “officially declared priorities and de-facto interests that are implemented in 
real  life”.  Official  slogans  on  “modernisation”  were  not  taken  seriously.  The  discussants 
explained the existing gap between what is proclaimed and what is practiced by the undue 
influence wielded by interest groups that control foreign policy-making in Russia, including 
raw-materials and export-oriented lobby which appears to be much stronger than promoters 
of high technology development and modernisation. 
Of course, in the 2000s, Russia’s gross domestic product has doubled, and Russia’s political 
system was stabilised under the semi-autocratic leadership of Putin-Medvedev. But these 
positive domestic developments did not translate into a breakthrough on the international 
front. On the contrary, Russia’s resurgence seemed, paradoxically, to be accompanied by a 
deterioration of relations between Moscow and its Western partners.  4 |  DERIGLAZOVA, MAKARYCHEV & REUT 
 
The Russian Foreign Ministry is largely described as an institution that is clan-like, stiff, 
inert,  highly  conservative,  insensitive  to  new  ideas,  and  reproducing  the  Soviet-style 
communicative practices that only alienate Russia from the West. It is revealing that none of 
the  IR  graduates  interviewed  is  considering  the  pursuit  of  a  diplomatic  career  due  to 
insufficient professional and financial incentives, as well as the discouraging bureaucratic 
environment.  
Some respondents referred to their own experience with a discriminatory recruitment policy 
of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  which  disadvantages  regional  graduates  and  female 
applicants  and  also  affects  the  quality  of  policy-making.  One  respondent  from  Tomsk 
emotionally  said:  “Who  makes  foreign  policy  in  Russia?  Are  they  Muscovites  with  their 
narrow  vision  of  how  everything  should  be  run?”  Another  respondent having  extensive 
work  experience  in  regional  administration  mentioned  that  Russian  officials  from  the 
Foreign Ministry are often inaccessible, arrogant and unwilling to improve their professional 
knowledge  after  having  attained  a  certain  position  as  if  they  already  have  learned 
everything.  
Correspondingly, most of the respondents claimed that the widespread negative perceptions 
of Russia in the West are largely substantiated. Russia essentially has no new message to 
deliver to the West and therefore is very weak in a global information milieu. The research 
showed that the image of Russia in the world has not changed much since the time of the fall 
of  the  USSR.  Russia  is  often  portrayed  as  a  country  that  is  difficult  to  understand, 
insufficiently  transparent  and  appears  uncivilised.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  issue  of 
stereotypes was emotionally discussed as a failure of communication between Russia and the 
West.  The  negative  roles  of  mass  media  and  immigrants  from  Russia  who  support  and 
reproduce such stereotypes were also mentioned.  
Fourthly, young Russian experts are far from adapting the rhetoric of sovereignty. In its 
stead,  they  prefer  enjoying  the  benefits  of  globalisation  and  taking  advantage  –  both 
personally  and  professionally  –  of  plugging  into  transnational  exchanges  and 
communication flows. Yet they deplore en masse that almost all cross-border projects are 
financed by their Western partners and colleagues, while their own state – obviously not 
short of money! – stays completely aloof and even hinders the development of grassroots 
public  or  cultural  diplomacy  by  pressuring  foreign  non-governmental  institutions  and 
artificially creating negative images of the West. 
The  research  made  clear  that  a  major  obstacle  to  effective  foreign  policy  is  the  limited 
political and economic capacities of Russian regions. For example, from the early post-Soviet 
years, the Republic of Karelia was an active participant in sub-regional projects promoting 
‘soft’  security  cooperation  across  the  Russian-Finnish  border.  Uniquely  among  Russian 
regions, it acquired its own representative in the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Council 
of  the  Barents  Euro-Arctic  Region,  although  its  involvement  in  these  institutions  was 
sporadic and guided by the federal centre. The cross-border cooperation programmes have 
undoubtedly generated a sense of inclusion in the wider sub-region among Karelian policy 
analysts and provided learning models for regional administration, local self-government 
and  civil  society.  The  Petrozavodsk-based  interviews  have  clearly  shown  that  Russia’s 
involvement  in  the  EU’s  regional  initiatives  facilitated  joint  responses  with  neighbouring 
countries  to  a  range  of  common  ‘soft’  security  challenges.  Cross-border  cooperation 
arrangements have promoted mutual understanding between Russia’s frontier regions and 
their neighbours, and provided an important alternative channel to state-level contacts.  
Fifthly,  almost  all  of  the  young  people  participating  in  the  interviews  were  certain  that 
Russia desperately needs to find new forms of influence in the world, different from military 
might  and  energy  supplies.  One  respondent  from  Tomsk  made  the  following  comment RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT IS NOT SEEN FROM THE KREMLIN | 5 
 
regarding Russia’s role in the world market of oil and gas: “I am not sure that the energy 
policy  should  be  treated  as  a  success,  even  if  it  is  often  portrayed  this  way  by  Russian 
officials.  I  don’t  want  to  live  in  a  country  that  is  widely  perceived  as  a  raw-materials 
appendage  to  the  rest  of  the  world.”  Others  indicated  that  military  issues  are  gradually 
decreasing  in  importance,  while  the  role  of soft  power  and  economic  innovation,  on the 
contrary, is on the rise. Most of the young people participating in the interviews mentioned 
that the use of coercive diplomacy to settle conflicts over resources or political influence is 
becoming  virtually  inconceivable;  some  envisage  a  kind  of  nascent  security  community 
developing  across  Russia’s  borders  based  on  shared  norms  and  values,  reciprocity  and 
common interests. Yet both Russia’s ideational and normative appeals and its technological 
modernisation prospects are seriously under question. 
Against this backdrop, it is indicative that most of the respondents saw the major threats to 
Russian security as originating inside the country itself. They mentioned poor environmental 
protection,  matters  of  information  security,  ineffectiveness  of  police  in  combating  crime, 
terrorism  and  narcotics,  degrading  technological  infrastructure  (from  housing  to  atomic 
stations) and so forth. Many respondents assumed that splits within the society (between the 
rich and the poor, between the public and the powerful institutions) represent a real danger 
for the country’s well being and stability. Some of the interviewees admitted that the external 
environment is “mild” for Russia in the sense that none of the major powers is eager to take 
advantage of Russia’s obvious internal weaknesses. By the same token, references to “NATO 
tanks allegedly ready to invade Russia” were put in a clearly ironic context.  
Perhaps, the only noteworthy external threat that was touched upon by the respondents 
from  Nizhny  Novgorod  was  China  as  a  source  of  mass-scale  –  and  mostly  informal  – 
migration and possible creeping expansion into the Russian Far East and Siberia. For most 
speakers, China is associated with either threats or indifference to Russia, which – again – 
contradicts the official policy discourse of Moscow. Interestingly, most of the respondents in 
Tomsk (located in Western Siberia) with their own extensive experiences in working with the 
Chinese and in China were reluctant to portray China as a source of migration or economic 
challenges. Moreover, they believed that China’s economic activity helps to develop Russia’s 
more remote regions that are otherwise abandoned by the central government. In evaluating 
Russia’s  official  rhetoric  of  partnership  with  China,  many  said  that  it  reflects  a  lack  of 
understanding  of  China  in  Moscow.  Respondents  noted  that  China  –  in  comparison  to 
European countries – is not interested in contributing to Russia’s growth and developing its 
infrastructure, science and technology.  
Analysis and Implications 
 As we can see, there is a huge semantic gap between the Kremlin’s triumphalist narrative of 
Russia  in  the  world,  and  the  opinions  of  young  urban  (regional)  professionals  who  are 
deeply critical of their country’s international profile. The bad news is that most of them do 
not expect any meaningful improvement in Russia’s behaviour in the near future. But the 
good news is that at least some of them still believe that the society itself – without the state’s 
guidance  or  supervision  –  is  capable  of  bridging  cultural  and  communication  gaps  with 
neighbouring countries and, by so doing, of reinvigorating Russia’s European identity.  
One young specialist described the perception of Russia in the outer world as a “state bear”, 
which has rather negative connotations, sustained by the emblem of the ruling United Russia 
party. Many respondents believed that the main challenge facing the country is the need to 
diversify its economy, to improve relations with other countries and to find its own niche in 
the world, based on pragmatic and realistic calculations of its national needs. The good news 6 |  DERIGLAZOVA, MAKARYCHEV & REUT 
 
is  that  most  of  the  respondents  indicated  willingness  to  contribute  to  confronting  this 
challenge.  
The perceptional gap, by and large, stems from the Kremlin’s inertia and poor adaptation to 
a fast-changing world in which the states have no other option but to change – for the sake of 
their survival. Official Moscow sticks to a set of obsolete Westphalian and sovereignty-based 
approaches which become less and less relevant in the 21st century. This is largely due to the 
Kremlin’s  obstinacy  with  the  sovereignty-based  political  discourse  and  attempts  to 
manipulate domestic public opinion by artificially creating hostile and threatening images of 
the West. All this only invigorates a value gap between Europe and Russia, which boils 
down to stark differences between a political community that inhabits a post-national and, to 
some extent, post-modern world, and one that is still stuck in reproducing old patterns of 
modernity with its hierarchical and state-centric thinking. 
On the official level, the EU and Russia very differently interpret the ideas of freedom, civil 
society and human rights. They certainly disagree on the meaning of sovereignty in a world 
of trans- and supra-national patterns of integration. Yet on the societal level, this value gap is 
much less noticeable, which was convincingly demonstrated by the interviews, as well as by 
mass-scale protests in Moscow and other large cities of Russia. The young generation of 
Russian  students  and  educators,  NGO  activists  and  urban  professionals,  who  could  be 
identified  as  the  first  post-9/11  generation,  has  absolutely  no  problem  in  either 
understanding or communicating with their Western counterparts. They are interested in 
learning  to  live  in  a  post-Soviet,  post-modern,  post-industrial  and  post-sovereign  world. 
Social networks hopefully will decrease the importance of value distance as well. From a 
practical  viewpoint,  this  means  that  the  more  the  societies  directly  interact  (i.e.  without 
government supervision) with each other, the greater are the chances for leaving the value 
gap behind. Yet this gap can be bridged only with the advent of a new generation of Russian 
politicians, with a different mentality and much wider worldviews. This can happen only in 
the case of a radical modernisation of Russian political institutions, since it is unlikely that 
the EU will take further political steps towards the Kremlin, which has a steady reputation of 
being a manipulative, repressive and corrupt regime, drastically different in its normative 
foundations from most of the European states. Ideally, the current Russian regime could 
have  fostered  Russia’s  openness  to  the  world,  mostly  in  non-political  domains  (cultural 
exchanges, educational and academic projects, supporting civil society initiatives, etc.), but 
this prospect seems to be too optimistic due to the Kremlin’s prevailing attitudes towards 
Russian NGOs working with foreign funds. 
The most the EU can do in this situation is to maintain the issues of democracy and human 
rights  in  its  political  agenda  with  Russia.  The  EU  has  to  insist  that  Russia  observes  the 
normative obligations it has undertaken – a legal argument can be more persuasive for the 
Kremlin than purely humanitarian talks. The EU has to insist on expanding the agenda of 
bilateral relations by including NGOs with their concerns and interests, thus contributing to 
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